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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 950568-CA
Priority No. 2

MICHAEL YODER,
Defendant/Appellant

By this appeal, Appellant Michael Yoder ("Yoder") is seeking
a fair and just trial. The federal and state constitutions forbid
officers from conducting warrantless searches based on hunches
and gut instinct, and from strong-arming citizens into consent.
Since specific evidence against Yoder was illegally obtained, it
should be suppressed pursuant to an order from this Court reversing the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress and
remanding the case for further disposition consistent therewith.
POINT I. THE STATE#S ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE WARRANTLESS
SEARCH IGNORE IMPORTANT FACTS AND MISREPRESENT THE LAW,
The state has dedicated three Points in the Argument to the
warrantless search issue.

(Brief of Appellee ("Br.App.") 15-44.)

Each point assumes to capture the spirit of this Court's review
by establishing the officers' actions should not be considered in
a vacuum, but must be viewed in context with the "totality of the
circumstances." (Br.App. 17-18; 23-24; 29.) "Totality of the circumstances" concerns such matters as the officer's conduct, the
number of officers present, and the duration, location, and time
of events leading up to the search. See U.S. v. Lattimore, 87
F.3d 647, 650 (4th Cir. 1996).

In this case, a review of those
1

matters discredits the state's claim that the search was valid.
A. CONTRARY TO THE STATE'S ASSERTIONS, THE ALLEGED CONSENT
WAS A PRODUCT OF HARASSMENT AND DURESS.
1. The Totality-of-the-Circumstances Analysis Concerns the
Facts and Prevailing Mood Prior to the Search.
The state concedes it is required to prove consent has been
voluntarily and freely given without duress or coercion, express
or implied. (Br.App. 16-23.) 1 In this case, the state downplayed
the "duress and coercion" that preceded the search.

(See Id.)

It claims that during Yoder's lengthy encounter with
officers just inside the front door of his apartment, the mood at
times was cooperative and "invit[ing]," officers were deferential

1

The state claims that in determining the voluntariness of consent
the "[court's indulgence in] every reasonable presumption against wavier
of fundamental constitutional rights" as articulated in State v.
Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 887-88 (UtahApp.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105
(Utah 1990), is not part of the inquiry. (Br.App. n. 8.) In support of
that proposition, the state cites to State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256,
1263 (Utah 1993). The Thurman court did not disavow the well-established
principle that the fourth amendment proscribes all unreasonable searches
and seizures, and that "searches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable."
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (quoting Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). Nor did the Thurman court reject the
proposition that the burden is on the state to prove the search falls
within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement under the
constitution. See e.g. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749 (1984);
Pavton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980); State v. Romero, 660 P.2d
715, 717-18 (Utah 1983) ; State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 178 (Utah 1983) ;
State v. Griffin, 626 P.2d 478, 482 (Utah 1981). Indeed, the factors
identified in Yoder's opening brief (Brief of Appellant at 32) must be
applied to determine the validity of the consent.
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the consent was
"unequivocal and specific" and "freely and voluntarily given"; (2)
the government must prove consent was given without duress or
coercion, express or implied; and (3) the courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and there must be convincing evidence that
such rights were waived.
Marshall, 791 P.2d at 887-888 (quoting. United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d
883, 885 (10th Cir. 1977)); U.S. v. Muldrow, 19 F.3d 1332, 1336 (10th
Cir.) cert, denied, 115 S.Ct. 175 (1994) (court indulges every reasonable
presumption against waiver of a constitutional right).
2
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2

Closer examination of the state's accusation suggests t h e state
meant to say Yoder did not set forth "what didn't happen." For example,
the officers "didn't" display their g u n s .
(Br.App. 21.)
3

he "would do so" (Br.App. 18-19; R. 477; 519); 3 officers "begged
and pleaded" for consent to search Yoder's premises and explained
"over and over" the reasons for wanting to conduct the search
(Br.App. 19; 21; 22); and Yoder repeatedly "resist[ed] their
ardent, forthright requests" (Br.App. 22).
The officers' requests for 45 minutes in the face of Yoder 7 s
resistance were sufficient to poison the fruits of the search.
Yet there was more.

The state omitted the fact that Yoder called

911 and reported officers trespassing in his home. The dispatcher
refused to help and suggested Yoder cooperate. (R. 653-55.) Also,
Yoder told officers he wanted to talk to his attorney. (Id.)
In examining the surrounding circumstances to determine
3

Such representations reflect confidence and arrogance in Calls'
abilities -- his message to Yoder was that he could lawfully search the
premises with or without consent. Those clear expressions constitute
coercive tactics particularly when coupled with other factors, including
the officers' unrelenting requests to search in the face of Yoder's
refusal to cooperate. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 549
(1968); (see Brief of Appellant at 22-27.)
Any intimation that the warrant will automatically be issued should
be considered as coercive as the announcement of an invalid warrant
in Bumper. Drawing the line at this point admittedly makes validity
of consent turn in some instances on subtle shifts of wording by the
agent. But words spoken in the process of obtaining consent to
waiver of a constitutional right ought to be chosen with care. The
officers are not proceeding in haste to make a split-second decision
of their authority to apprehend a fleeing suspect. They face a
situation that normally calls for the delay necessary to obtain a
search warrant. If they are to forego this requirement, it should
not be too much to ask that they take care not to confront the
accused with a choice that totally obliterates the important
protective function of the warrant-issuing process.
U.S. v. Faruolo, 506 F.2d 490, 497 (2d Cir. 1974) (Newman, J.
concurring); State v. Allenf 612 P.2d 199, 204-05 (Mont. 1980) (tenant's
consent to search apartment invalid in face of officer's threat that
consent was not necessary -- "fraudulent show of authority").
The state retreated from its characterization of Call's dealings
with Yoder and attempted to dilute the confidence Call expressed in his
abilities to obtain the warrant by asserting that Call merely told Yoder
he would "seek" the issuance of a warrant. (Br.App. 18-19.) The state
has distorted Call's testimony to bolster its argument.
4
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Citizens do not forfeit their constitute.,:
5

E

rights when they are

coerced to comply with a request that they would prefer to
refuse." Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991).
In addition, to be valid the consent may not be an
exploitation of a prior illegality, i.e. trespass and/or
illegally detaining and seizing Yoder for a period of between 2 0
minutes and an hour.4

After officers made their initial check -

- as instructed by Officer William McCarthy ("McCarthy") -- and
determined Yoder appeared nervous and intoxicated (R. 333; 34950; 603-04; 613-14; 635), they unlawfully remained on the pre-

4

The state claims Yoder waived his argument on appeal concerning
the illegality of the officers on the premises.
(Br.App. 38-39.)
However, the record reflects Yoder argued the officers were not lawfully
on the premises. (R. 677; 681-83; 54-55; 127-28.)
Whether the illegality arose as a trespass or an impermissible
expansion of the scope of their original activities is inconsequential.
The result is the same: There was no proof of an unequivocal break in the
chain of illegality sufficient to dissipate the taint of the officers'
actions. U.S. v. Hearn, 496 F.2d 236, 243 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 419
U.S. 1048 (1974) (although defendant did not withhold consent officers
improperly obtained it in exploitation of prior illegal conduct); U.S.
v. Babwah, 972 F.2d 30, 34 (2d Cir. 1992) (illegal arrest tainted
consent, as "the whole purpose of extending [defendant's] custody seems
to have been the hope of obtaining his consent") ; State v. Rushton, 870
P. 2d 1355, 1361-62 (Mont. 1994) (consent involuntary where, among other
things, officers implied they could detain defendant in his home for
unreasonable period of time while warrant was being obtained).
The officers were required to "'diligently [pursue] a means of
investigation that [is] likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions
quickly, during which time it [is] necessary to detain the defendant.'"
State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994) (citations omitted). In
this matter they failed in that task. The unlawful conduct and unreasonable detention were tantamount to trespass and an arrest unsupported by
probable cause. In the alternative, they constituted an unconstitutional
seizure unsupported by reasonable suspicion. See Florida v. Rover, 460
U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983) (reasonable suspicion of crime is insufficient
to justify custodial interrogation even though it is investigative);
United States v. Chamberlin, 644 F.2d 1262, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 453 U.S. 914 (1981) (although of ficers' reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity justified brief inquiry, the 20-minute detention was
improper absent probable cause); State v. Maestas, 815 P.2d 1319, 1322
(Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992) (unless
defendant is parolee, absent consent or exigency plus probable cause,
arrest warrant is required before defendant can be arrested in his home) .
6
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The state relies on Bobo, 803 r.~u _ _._ _ . to support the
assertion that Yoder's alleged consent was "voluntary." In Bobo, this
Court rejected as misleading the officer's representation that a warrant
would inevitably be issued since "[n]o tricks were employed by the law
enforcement [officers. When] they said they were getting a warrant they
were in the process of getting a warrant [through the efforts of] the
county attorney." Id. at 1273. Also, as the state recognized in Bobo,
"no magistrate would have difficulty in finding probable cause."
(Br.App. 21.) After all, officers were invited into defendant's home and
"saw a pipe in plain view on a counter" that smelled of marijuana.
Defendant was placed under arrest. When he was searched incident to the
arrest, a small vial containing a white substance was found." Id. at
1270. Finally, the defendant never refused consent to search,
[H] e had simply not said they could search. The detective repeated
his request [to search] , telling the defendant that his consent
(continued...)
7

the illegal conduct and the alleged "consent," the consent was
illegally obtained and the fruits of the search were poisoned.
Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
2. A Reasonable Person Would Have Understood the Limits of
the Search to Be as Described in Plain English by Eyre.
Under the analysis identified by the state the scope of the
search is what "the typical reasonable person" would have
understood it to be.

(Br.App. 23-24.)

In this case, the scope

of the search was defined by Salt Lake County Deputy Kenneth Eyre
("Eyre"), who conducted the search. Yoder did not testify.

Thus,

the trial court was not required to wade through conflicts in
testimony or differing interpretations.

Either the trial court

believed Eyre's testimony and the search was limited in scope, or
it did not believe his testimony and there is no evidence of the
alleged consent.

(See Brief of Appellant at 12.)

Eyre testified the search would be conducted under the
following conditions:
(Eyre) A.

I wanted to make it clear to him that it

would

iust be himself
and J, that we would be the only ones, and I
said, you know, Mike, I says, how about if iust you and I
search
the balcony.
I said, the West Valley officers won't
have anything to do with it. They'll stay here. Just
you

and me, let's
Q.

iust

you and me go out and

look.

Is that what happened?

b

(. ..continued)
would expedite the process. Defendant then told the detective that
he wished to get it over with, and that the officers could search.
Id. The state's reliance on Mincev v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394, 98
S.Ct. 2408, 2414 (1978) , is perplexing since that case did not deal with
consent to conduct a warrantless search. (Br.App. 21.) In Mincev, a case
concerning the murder of a police officer, the United States Supreme
Court rejected the state's argument that the warrantless search of the
homicide scene (the suspect's apartment) was valid under any recognized
exception. Id. 437 U.S. at 390.
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issued

warrants.6

The suggestion that a warrantless

search

is

unlimited except insofar as the object of the search is defined,
has no basis in the law.

See Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Proc.

§ SS 240.3 (1975) (providing that consent searches can be limited
in duration or physical scope).

An "officer has no more right to

make a search beyond the limits prescribed in a consent to
search, then he has to exceed the limit prescribed in a search
warrant." People v. Schmoll. 48 N.E.2d 933, 934 (111. 1943).
Finally, the state recognized that a suspect may revoke
consent to search, and asserts revocation must be "clear and
unequivocal."

(Br.App. 25.)

By Yoder's conduct in opening and

shutting the balcony closet and saying, "See, there's nothing out
here" (R. 623), he demonstrated clear revocation of alleged
consent.

He did not "demonstrate[]" that the closet was "within

the scope of the search" as claimed by the state. (Br.App. 25.) 7
Eyre understood that Yoder still refused to give consent with
comments like: "I don't have anything here. There's -- you're not
6

See Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-23-201 (1995) (things, place and person
to be searched must be described with particularity in issued warrant);
77-23-203 (1995) (magistrate is required to place conditions on search
in certain instances); 77-23-205 (1995) (time to be specified).
7

The state relies on United States v. Stoecker, 13 M.J. 879, 881
(ACMR 1982) , in support of the proposition that by going to the balcony
closet and opening and closing the door, Yoder "demonstrated that he
believed the closet to be within the scope of the search." (Br.App. at
25: state asserts that according to Stoecker, "voluntarily passing down
boxes for examination showed expectation that containers would be
inspected.") Review of the Stoecker case reflects it is inapposite. In
addition, the state failed to disclose the subsequent history of the
Stoecker case. After the United States Army Court of Military Review
denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence in Stoecker, 13 M.J.
at 879, the United States Court of Military Appeals reversed and remanded
the lower court's ruling, and dismissed the charge for lack of evidence.
United States v. Stoecker, 17 M.J. 158 (USCMA 1984) .
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going to find anything here, those kinds of comments." (R. 33235; 622.)

Eyre felt "between" him and Yoder consent was actually

given only when Yoder "immediately without any hesitation said,
okay, and he went back to walk in front of me towards the
balcony, went out on the balcony first.

I followed after him."

(Id.) Thus, Eyre must have understood Yoder's comment "there's
nothing out here," to trigger revocation.
Likewise, reasonable people understand the expression
"there's nothing out here" to mean there is no need to continue
with a particular line of inquiry or review. Such an expression
is distinguishable from comments and actions of suspects in cases
cited by the state. See U.S. v. Alfaro, 935 F.2d 64, 68 (5th Cir.
1991) (the statement, "I have to go outside to talk" is not
revocation); Burton v. U.S., 657 A.2d 741, 748 (D.C. App. 1994)
(placing hand in pocket is not revocation). No other possible
explanation or meaning but revocation exists for Yoder's conduct.
See Burton, 657 A.2d at 748 ("objective reasonableness" test was
not passed where other explanations for conduct existed).
B. THE EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES EXCEPTION IS INAPPLICABLE:
OFFICERS' FAILURE TO SEARCH UNTIL THEY HAD ALLEGED CONSENT
REFLECTS THEY KNEW THEY LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE.
The state claims the following supports probable cause:
(1) Shalee's clothes were found in an area previously
searched and to which was [sic] defendant's building was
closest, (2) defendant was seen on the balcony above the
site of the clothing watching the gathering crowd below, (3)
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during the officer's [sic] lengthy discussion explaining
their purpose in being there, their concern for Shalee and
their request to search, defendant perspired profusely,
appeared extremely nervous and refused to cooperate so that
Officer Call concluded that defendant had something to hide
about Shalee's disappearance and (4) "given the nature of
the officer's urgent plea and all of the circumstances,
Officer Call concluded that a reasonable individual would
say: 'Certainly, please look;' so that the officers could
get on to the next apartment in their search."
(Br.App. 2 9.)

Factors (1) and (2) only place Yoder in the

apartment complex vicinity, together with numerous other people
both on the grounds and in the buildings, at the time the
clothing was discovered.

Nothing in the record suggests that

when officers went up to Yoder's apartment, they had any reason
to suspect he was involved in Shalee's disappearance.8
Factors (3) and (4), Yoder sweating and appearing nervous
and Yoder's refusal to consent to a search of his premises, are
consistent with intoxication and an apparent lack of interest in
the situation.

Such factors do not give rise to probable cause.

An officer testified that numerous people are nervous when
talking with police (R. 603-04; 613-14).
The officers in this case "concluded that defendant had

Even after officers could reflect on the relevance of events that
evening, they did not testify that they linked the appearance of clothing
to Yoder or his apartment. Call testified the clothing was found closest
to Building K, which housed numerous apartments and tenants, including
Yoder (R. 513; 550) . McCarthy testified there were no apartments directly
above or below where the clothing was found. (R. 560.) When McCarthy
directed other officers to check whether Yoder had seen anything, he did
not believe
the clothing had been thrown from an apartment in Building
K. (R. 560.) Eyre did not link the clothes to the apartment building.
(R. 362-64; 623-24.) Officers were concerned that the abductor may be in
the crowd or in one of the apartment complexes. (R. 435-37, 490-91.)
Numerous explanations for the appearance of the clothing existed. (See
Brief of Appellant at n. 2.) Officers had no reason to suspect Yoder of
criminal conduct when the clothes were found.
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something to hide about Shalee's disappearance" based on hunches
and instincts. (Br.App. 29-31.) According to the state, it was
Yoder's "patent refusal to assist police in their mission" that
triggered officers7 suspicions and alleged "reasonable belief"
that he was connected to Shalee's disappearance. (Id.)
"[I]n order for probable cause to search to exist, the
officer must have reasonable trustworthy information of
supporting facts and circumstances such as would persuade a
person of reasonable caution to believe the search is justified."
U.S. v. Infante-Ruiz, 13 F.3d 498, 502 (1st Cir. 1994).

"[I]n

the absence of supporting facts, the officer's suspicion or
personal belief that probable cause exists is not enough."

There

must be particular facts indicting that the area to be searched
contains evidence of crime or some other seizable matter.

Id.

In State v. Hewitt, 841 P.2d 1223, 1224 (Utah App. 1992),
the state acknowledged that in light of State v. Robinson, 797
P.2d 431, 436 (Utah App. 1990), State v. Lovecrren, 829 P.2d 155,
158 (Utah App. 1992), and State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652, 654
(Utah App. 1992), nervous behavior is insufficient to give rise
to reasonable articulable suspicion to detain an individual. This
Court agreed. Hewitt, 841 P.2d at 1224 (Russon, J . ) ; see also
Mova v. U.S., 761 F.2d 322, 325 (7th Cir. 1984) (it is reasonable
to expect one to feel stress when questioned by police).

If

nervousness does not support reasonable suspicion, it cannot be
sufficient to support probable cause. As Chief Justice Zimmerman
stated, "I find ludicrous the State's argument that because these
13

individuals appeared to have been unsettled by the officers'
extraordinary conduct, the officers had justification for suspecting that something improper was going on."

State v. Mendoza.

748 P.2d 181, 187 (Utah 1987) (Zimmerman, J., concurring).
Likewise, probable cause cannot be established because a
person fails to cooperate with officials.

"[T]here are several

innocent explanations for a lack of forthrightness with law
enforcement officers."

Mova v. U.S., 761 F.2d at 325.

Although a trained officer may have a "sixth sense" or
suspicions because of a person's responses "i.e., defendant's
incomprehensible disavowal of empathy for the feelings of a
missing five-year old's parents" (Br.App. 31), to validate a
search on such a basis would be tantamount to giving law enforcement unbridled discretion in conducting warrantless searches. The
constitution prohibits such searches and requires officers to
present reasons for a search to a neutral, objective magistrate
for the issuance of a warrant.

As an exception to the warrant

requirement, before an officer may conduct a search, he must
articulate objective facts giving rise to probable cause and
exigent circumstances. "Articulable probable cause" provides a
principled limitation on an officer's discretion and power. Even
with hindsight, officers in this action were unable to articulate
circumstances giving rise to probable cause. The state must be
required to forego the evidence illegally seized.
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C. THE STATE HAS MISCONSTRUED THE PREMISE UNDERLYING THE
EMERGENCY AID DOCTRINE.
The state places too much emphasis on State v. Mitchell, 347
N.E.2d 607 (N.Y.App. 1976).

Notwithstanding the Mitchell court's

prohibition against warrantless searches based on inexplicable
facts, the court validated the search of defendant's hotel room
as the "last room to be searched on the 6th floor," where the
victim's half-eaten sandwich was found and she was last seen
cleaning.

Id. at 608.

The Mitchell court "hastened to admonish" use of this very
limited privilege, since police activity must "be grounded in
empirical facts rather than subjective feelings." Id. at 609-10.
Police must have a valid reason for believing an emergency exists
in the area to be searched. Id.; State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916,
921 (Utah App. 1995) (search based on exigent circumstances to
ascertain occupant's safety must cease once safety is determined) . Officers' beliefs grounded in subjective feelings and
hunches are insufficient to warrant a search under the doctrine.
In this case, Eyre, who conducted the warrantless search,
could not base his feelings on anything relating to the immediate
situation. He admitted as much: "Maybe some of that was a concern
for a little girl who was missing.

I have a young girl who is of

almost the same age, and the entire situation was a pretty tense
situation."

(R. 637.)

He could not articulate empirical facts

connecting the area to be searched to an emergency. In fact, even
when Eyre was on the balcony with Yoder, he did not believe
Shalee "could be in or around" the area, but due to a
15

"premonition," he felt it would be "appropriate" to check the
closet. (R. 337; 362-64; 623-24.)
In addition, under the "emergency aid" and "community
caretaker" doctrines, officers are not permitted to explore the
area as Eyre did in this case.
of administering immediate aid.

They enter only for the purpose
Thus, where entry of a hotel

room was undertaken for the purpose of aiding a person the police
were told had suffered a gunshot wound, but the room was found
unoccupied, it was illegal for the officer then to open a suitcase. See U.S. v. Godenstein, 456 F.2d 1006, 1010-11 (8th Cir.
1972); Bass v. State, 732 S.W.2d 632, 635 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)
(entry of a dwelling to look for missing person, by exceeding the
permissible scope of a search for appellant's body or signs of
foul play, officer rendered an initially good search bad).

The

emergency aid doctrine does not justify the search in this case.
D.
SHALEE'S TESTIMONY AND THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL SEARCH ARE
INSEPARABLY LINKED.
The state does not dispute that if this Court determines the
search was conducted in violation of the fourth amendment,
evidence obtained in connection therewith lacks sufficient
attenuation to purge the taint of the illegal conduct. (See
Br.App. 39.)

However, the state argues the exclusionary rule

should not be applied to the testimony of a live witness, i.e.
Shalee, and has cited to U.S. v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 277
(1978), which concerns suppression of the testimony of a thirdparty bystander as opposed to a witness actually discovered
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during the illegal search. Id.
The state has identified a number of Ceccolini factors
"relevant to determining whether a live witness's testimony
should be suppressed."

(Br.App. 41.)

On the one hand, the

Ceccolini factors are inapplicable to this case.

Central to

their application is the proposition that the witness is likely
to be discovered by legal means. "Witnesses are not like guns or
documents which remain hidden from view until one turns over a
sofa or opens a filing cabinet"; they come forward and offer
evidence entirely of their own volition.

Id. at 276.

The

greater the "likelihood" that they otherwise will come forward,
the more applicable the Ceccolini factors.
Thus, if "the search was conducted by the police for the
specific purpose of discovering [the] potential witnesses" the
logic of Ceccolini does not apply and the analysis is different.
Id. at 276 n.4.

Indeed, the witness is like a gun or document,

where the witness is the product of the illegal search. In that
instance, the taint cannot be dissipated under the rationale of
Ceccolini.

"[W]e cannot be unmindful of the principles estab-

lished by long precedent which have sought to preserve the
sanctity of the home and the right of privacy of the individual
merely because the evidence has changed from inanimate to animate
form."

People v. Albea, 118 N.E.2d 277, 279 (111. 1954) (search

resulted in discovery and seizure of human being who is later
used as material witness in prosecution; court declines to adopt
rule separate from that concerning illegal seizure of papers and
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other property); State v. Rogers, 198 N.E.2d 796 (Ohio 1963);
Garza v. State, 771 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. App. 1989) .
On the other hand, the differences in Ceccolini and this
case emphasize the difference in outcome when the factors are
applied.

The state has identified the first and second factors

as "(1) the degree of free will exercised by the witness, [and]
(2) whether illegally seized evidence was used in questioning the
witness."

(Br.App. 41-43.)

With respect to the first factor,

the state suggests that the court will take into consideration
whether the witness will testify of her own free will without
inducement from police. (Br.App. 42.)

The Ceccolini Court was

concerned with whether the witness would be discovered by legal
means, concomitantly reducing the incentive to conduct an illegal
search to discover the witness.

Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 276.

The

first and second factors cannot be met in this case where the
incentive did not reduce the use of illegal conduct. The officers
were intent on "search[ing] everything, everywhere" (R. 518) "to
verify that this little girl wasn't there."

(R. 592.) In

addition, Shalee was directly and physically discovered as a
result of the illegal conduct, and the prosecutor directly used
her and solicited testimony from her during evidentiary hearings.
The state identified "proximity" as the fourth factor in
Ceccolini.

(Br.App. 43.)

In that case, "substantial periods of

time elapsed between the time of the illegal search and the
initial contact with the witness."

Id. at 279. In this case, the

officers7 illegal search and contact with Shalee occurred
18

simultaneously.

This case differs markedly from Ceccolini.

Shalee's testimony is directly linked to the illegal search and
officers who conducted the search in an effort to find Shalee.
Finally, contrary to the state's assertion concerning the
third factor, applying the exclusionary rule in this case will
have a powerful, deterring effect on the behavior of officers.
From the beginning, this case has been highly publicized. If this
Court reverses the trial court's order on the motion to suppress,
the reversal will alert law enforcement to take care when
gathering evidence to ensure its admissibility in proceedings.
If the trial court's ruling is affirmed, searches made
without probable cause or valid consent will be encouraged,
especially in those cases where police are acting on a hunch and
believe they will obtain probable cause at some later point in
the investigation independent of the unlawful act.

A review of

the Ceccolini factors compels the determination that all evidence
obtained as a result of the illegal search in this case must be
suppressed, including live testimony.
POINT II. THE FACTS SUPPORT THAT IDLE KNEW HIS REMARKS TO
YODER WOULD ELICIT INCRIMINATING RESPONSES.
The state acknowledges that statements received through
interrogation, which may constitute words on the part of the
police eliciting an incriminating response from the suspect, must
be preceded by Miranda warnings.9 In this case, Officer Robert
9

In the "Statement of the Facts," the state incorrectly asserts
that Miranda warnings were given to Yoder (Br.App. 11) while he was
detained in his apartment for 45 minutes before being transported to
(continued...)
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Idle's ("Idle") statements to Yoder and his incriminating
responses were recorded.

Thus, the Court does not have to rely

on the memories of the witnesses, their descriptions of the mood,
or the state's mischaracterization of the incident.
While the state asserts Yoder talked almost constantly,
making rambling statements, the transcript of the conversation
defies that description.

(Addendum C to Brief of Appellant.)

Idle clearly was engaging Yoder in conversation.

In fact, Idle

initiated that portion of the conversation concerning the
evening's events.
The following is a taped conversation of suspect Michael
Yoder on case 93-48983.
Yoder:
(inaudible) I've spent 25 or 3 0 years staying
drunk trying to (inaudible) I have never hurt anybody in my
whole life, and I don't mind telling you (inaudible).
Idle:
(inaudible).
Yoder:
It would sure make me feel better.
(inaudible)
when I started feeling bad, probably kept alot of other
things from feeling bad. By the way I have a little 9 year
old little girl.
Idle:
Do ya? I sure would hate to see something like
this happen to her.
(Id.) In addition, contrary to the state's claim (Br.App. 46),
Idle engaged back and forth in conversation with Yoder. (See
Addendum C to Brief of Appellant.)
The state also claims "Idle had no reason to know defendant
was peculiarly susceptible to appeals to his conscience regarding
little girls" (Br.App. 47), and had "no reason to know" Yoder

y

(. . .continued)
jail. The record fails to support that assertion. Lynn Hanson testified
that he believed Vince Garcia or Detective Cowley "informed" him that
Yoder "had invoked" Miranda. (R. 453-54, 646.) Although Garcia testified,
he did not state that he had given the warnings to Yoder. Cowley did not
testify. Thus, no evidence exists to support Hanson's belief.
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"was unusually disoriented or upset" at the time of his arrest.
Yet the state admits Yoder made statements of remorse and concern
regarding Shalee immediately after she was discovered (Br.App.
44, n. 14), and Idle observed earlier that Yoder was "depressed,
despondent, very concerned about his future."

(Br.App. 47.)

Thus, Idle knew by engaging Yoder in conversation he may secure
incriminating remarks.
Finally, contrary to the state's assertion, Idle's remarks
were more than mere "offhand remarks" and "expressions of agreement."

They were directed at Yoder. Idle followed responsive

expressions with a statement of judgment concerning the
situation.

Further, the fact that Idle immediately engaged a

tape recorder on the drive to the jail (Br.App. 46) supports the
determination that Idle anticipated capturing incriminating
statements on tape in violation of Yoder's constitutional rights.
POINT III. THE RECORD DEFIES THE STATED ASSERTION THAT THE
ALIENISTS UNANIMOUSLY REFUSED TO FIND YODER MENTALLY ILL.
With respect to the trial court's determination that Yoder
is not mentally ill, the state recognized that Dr. Nancy Cohn
found Yoder "met the diagnostic criteria for paraphilia (sexual
deviance), major depression and possibly even panic disorder."
(Br.App. 50; Cohn Report at 2, 6.)

The state does not dispute

that Cohn also found Yoder suffers from chronic nervousness,
anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder, has a history of
alcohol dependence, is able to control depression with
medication, and would benefit from a "multi-layered program," or
if sentenced to prison, "a facility where such services are
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provided."

(Cohn Report at 2.)

Cohn clearly was prescribing

services necessary to treat mental illness.
Likewise, the state does not dispute that Dr. Eric Nielsen
specifically answered in the affirmative that "this man suffer [s]
from a mental illness."

(Nielsen Report at 1.)

He found Yoder

suffers from major depression and a long history of alcohol and
drug abuse.

(Nielsen Report at 1.)

Yet Nielsen concluded Yoder

did not meet the criteria for guilty and mentally ill "as
specified in Section 76-2-305(4)."

(Id. at 2.)

Even the trial court determined Yoder suffers from mental
illness, including major depression, a mood disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and a history of substance abuse, that
Yoder 7 s conditions improved with institutional care and
medication, and the State Hospital is appropriate for treatment
of those conditions. (R. 194-96; 200; 742-43.)

However, the

trial court incorrectly ruled that because counseling and
treatment were available to Yoder at the Utah State Prison, Yoder
failed to qualify for the status of mentally ill.

(Id.)

The

trial court misapplied the law.
In its brief, the state also incorrectly applied sentencing
criteria to support a mental illness finding.
Contrary to defendant's assertions both examiners plainly
recognized that commitment was not required in this case:
(a) defendant was not presently or actively suicidal; (b)
defendant was capable of working and had done so in the
past, though he would need a good deal of support; (c)
although "the State Hospital is clearly capable of treating
[defendant's] depression and providing some treatment for
his substance abuse problems[, t]he State Hospital, however
does not have a treatment program for child sex abusers";
defendant was a candidate for sex offender and substance
abuse treatment, which "may be provided while in custody, or
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in an outpatient setting should the defendant be released."
(Br.App. 50-51 (cites omitted).)

Both the state and the trial

court looked to criteria for sentencing
currently

mentally

ill,u

a defendant

who

"is

Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-104 (3) (Supp.

1996) (emphasis added), to assert Yoder is

not

mentally

ill.

Section 77-16a-104 (3) provides the methods for imposing
sentencing after the court finds by clear and convincing evidence
that the defendant is mentally ill, while Utah Code Ann. § 76-2305(4) (1995) defines mental illness.

See State v. Murphy, 872

P.2d 480, 483 (Utah App. 1994) (recognizing Section 76-2-305(4)
contains the definition for mental illness, while Section 77-16a104's predecessor concerns sentencing). The trial court
incorrectly applied the sentencing factors to determine the
underlying question of mental illness.
Because the overwhelming evidence supports a finding of
mentally ill as recognized by the trial court (R. 194-96; 200;
742-43), the trial court's ruling should be vacated and remanded
for further proceedings consistent with the law. The trial court
already has recommended that Yoder "receive early intervention
and treatment in the sexual offenders program and the program for
chronic substance abuse while at the Utah State Prison."

(R.

204.) Such a recommendation carries little force. By qualifying
Yoder as mentally ill the trial court can take measures to ensure
Yoder receives treatment and care.

The trial court's failure to

correctly apply the law deprives Yoder of necessary treatment.
POINT IV. THE STATE CONCEDES CERTAIN FACTORS DEFINING THE
OFFENSE WERE CONSIDERED IN IMPOSING THE HARSHEST SENTENCE.
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The state concedes certain facts considered by the trial
court in imposing the harshest sentence in this matter are
inherent in the offenses of kidnapping and sexual abuse of a
child.

(Br.App. 55.)

In addition, those factors in part were

set forth in the Information as the charged offense (R. 10-12)
making them the basis for the conviction and elements of the
offense. Thus, it was improper for the trial court also to consider the factors as aggravating circumstances during sentencing.
See State v. Egbert, 748 P.2d 558, 559-60 (Utah 1987) .
In an effort to inflame this Court, the state improperly
suggests that the trial court considered "other uncharged"
conduct in determining Yoder had a contributing criminal history
and in imposing the harshest sentence against Yoder.
56.)

(Br.App.

To the extent that is true, Yoder 7 s right to due process

under art. I, sec. 7 of the Utah Constitution has been violated.
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled fundamental fairness requires
that procedures in the sentencing phase be designed to ensure the
decision-making process is based on accurate information.

State

v. Lioskv, 608 P.2d 1241, 1248 (Utah 1980); State v. Casarez, 656
P.2d 1005, 1007 (Utah 1982) ("Procedural fairness is as
obligatory at the sentencing phase of a trial as at a guilt
phase"); see also Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734,
735 (Utah 1991). 10

Reliance on unproved charges undermines the

10

Although the state agreed in the trial court proceedings that the
offenses at issue comprised an isolated incident in mitigation of the
sentence, the state now rejects that position. (Compare R. 740 ("We do
agree that this was a single incident") to Br.App. 56.) The state
asserts that the misdemeanor lewdness conviction identified in the
(continued...)
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accuracy of the process.

A defendant who is punished based on

unproven conduct suffers unfair prejudice and a violation of due
process.

See State v. Womack, 319 N.W.2d 17, 19 (Minn. 1982);

People v. Harvey, 159 Cal. Rptr. 696 (Cal. 1979); People v.
Griffin, 166 N.E.2d 684 (N.Y. 1960).
The trial court's improper consideration of certain aggravating circumstances in sentencing coupled with its willingness
to recommend treatment and its determination that Yoder is a good
candidate for a treatment program, compels the determination that
at a minimum this case should be remanded for resentencing.
CONCLUSION
Yoder respectfully requests the following: (1) the entry of
an order reversing the trial court's ruling on the motion to
suppress the evidence illegally obtained, including statements
obtained by police from Yoder in violation of his rights under
the fourth and fifth amendments to the federal constitution and
Shalee's testimony, or in the alternative, (2) an order remanding
the case for resentencing as requested herein.
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(...continued)
presentence report supports the trial court's determination that Yoder
had a "contributing prior history." (Id.) Significantly, that offense
was incorrectly characterized in the presentence report as an offense
involving an adult and a child.
(Presentence Report at 19.) The offense
involved only an adult.
(See R. at 730; see also R. 719-20 for additional
corrections to the presentence report.)
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